VOICE OF EXPERIENCE

BACKGROUND:

  • Businessman, CPA and Veteran
  • Former Pres. of CA Public Utilities Commission
  • Former Comm. of CA Transportation Commission
  • 30 years Financial and Accounting Experience

P. Gregory Conlon, Esq. (Wash. D C), CPA

43 Virginia Lane

Atherton, CA. 94027

Email: greg@gregconlon.com

 

October 2, 2017

 

Congressman Devin Nunes

Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee

Longworth House Office Building, Suite 1013

Washington, DC, 20515

 

Dear Congressman Nunes,

My original intent in sending this letter was to express my concern about whether the U. S. had adequate defense missiles and air power to stop a North Korean attack with multiple ICBMs, with attached nuclear war heads.  After doing more research of our capabilities my concerns were somewhat allayed.  Due to an oversight on my part I am resending the original letter to you and the attached parties.

If the present defense capabilities are not adequate today, I suggest that the U S Air Force go back to the military strategy of General Curtis Lemay, then Commander of the Strategic Air Command, (SAC), in the 1950’s.  This strategy was to have two bombers in the air 24/7 with nuclear weapons and bombs aboard to be able to perform a counter attack on Russia, if Russia would destroy all our Air Force capabilities in one strike.   I am not certain whether today’s       B-52s could be equipped with air-to-air missile power to counter attack North Korea.  My basis for this recommendation was the fact that I was supposed to pilot the B-47 bombers on such missions in the late 1950s.  But for a quirk of fate I was reassigned to flying C-124 Globe- masters, a large cargo plane. 

Next, I want to share with you some information that may help you and the Trump Administration address the present confrontation between North Korea and the U. S. and its allies. Four interested citizens that have both military and political backgrounds met to see if there was some relevant information we could share with you and the Administration that would be helpful in today’s dialog between the parties. 

Our research revealed the following facts that we believe would be important, if accurate, and could help in better understanding the position and thinking of the North Korea Government individuals.  If you and the staff of the Intelligence Committee of the House or the Congressional Research Office could confirm its accuracy, and you felt it would be helpful to your Intelligence Committee and other members in the House, including the leadership, you could share it with such members.  I will also send copies of this letter to National Security Advisor, H. R. McMaster; and Secretary of Defense, James Mattis; Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson and Congressman Paul Cook, your fellow Congressman from California, who is a member of the Armed Services Committee, and the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces. The reference in the facts below of AF refers to the 1994 Agreed Framework that was our major nuclear agreement with North Korea.  

Proposed Fact List on why North Korea doesn't trust the United States

 1. The AF kept North Korea from accessing its plutonium stockpile for the eight years that it was in force (1994-2002), and North Korea was unable to do its first nuclear test until 2006, four years after the AF was terminated.

2. North Korea made significant sacrifices under the AF by stopping construction of two large Magnox nuclear reactors, one of which was just a few years away from completion and the other about five years out. Without the AF, by now those reactors would have produced enough plutonium for hundreds of nuclear weapons. (Warhead production would have been limited by other factors, but North Korea would have an arsenal roughly ten times its current size if not for the AF.) When the AF was killed in 2002, both Magnox reactors had corroded so badly from exposure to the elements that neither could be completed.

3. The AF promised North Korea would get two more proliferation-resistant light water reactors (LWRs) to make up for the two proliferation-prone Magnox reactors that they stopped building. The LWRs were never delivered.

4. The AF promised North Korea would get annual shipments of 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil (HFO) until the LWRs were delivered, to make up for the energy the Magnox reactors would have produced. Those HFO shipments were often late and were terminated in 2002 when the AF was terminated. Without the AF, North Korea would not only have the huge plutonium stockpile described in #2 above, but it would have received energy for decades instead of less than ten years.

5. The reason given by Pres. Bush for killing the AF was that the North Koreans were doing uranium enrichment, which he regarded as a serious violation. However, neither the word uranium nor the word enrichment appears in the text of the AF (https://2001-2009.state.gov/t/ac/rls/or/2004/31009.htm) Uranium enrichment violated the spirit of the AF, but was not a technical violation. And, as noted in #3 and #4 above, our nation also pushed the limits of the AF.

6. When Gaddafi gave up his WMD programs in 2003, Pres. Bush promised him (https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rm/27459.htm) that “this good faith will be returned” and that "Libya can regain a secure and respected place among the nations, and over time, achieve far better relations with the United States.” Subsequent events led North Korea to state that, "Libya′s nuclear dismantlement, much touted by the U.S. in the past turned out to be a mode of aggression whereby the latter coaxed the former … to disarm itself and then swallowed it up by force.”

7. Considering the experience of Libya giving up its nuclear capabilities, the talks about denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, is as unreasonable from NK’s point of view.

 8. None of the above facts negate how reprehensible the North Korean regime is in terms of human rights, treatment of its population, etc. They are only intended to show that nuclear diplomacy with North Korea worked reasonably well from our perspective and that the need to rebuild trust is a problem that needs to be addressed by both nations.

 

I wanted to make a point that the UN Sanctions recently adopted by all the Security Council members are like the sanctions imposed on Japan before they attacked Pearl Harbor in 1941.  It is my understanding that these earlier sanctions against Japan cut off all their oil and scrape metal imports and significantly impacted its economy.  It is interesting that former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich, last Sunday mentioned the sanctions against Japan on last Sunday’s Fox News program with Chris Wallace 

One last recommendations that may already being planned through back channels is that there be a joint meeting between the Presidents of the U. S., China and North Korea in Beijing, China in November when President Trump is already scheduled to be there to meet with the present leader of China.  Following is a link to President Trump’s Press Release expressing a willingness to do so. http://www.cnn.com/2017/05/01/politics/donald-trump-meet-north-korea-kim-jong-un/index.html

Very truly yours,

 

Greg Conlon,

Former Captain and pilot in USAF Reserves, former President of the California Public Utilities Commission and former Republican Candidate for California State Treasurer.

 

CC’s:

President Donald Trump

Rex Tillerson, Secretary of State

James Mattis, Secretary of Defense

H.R. McMaster, National Security Advisor

Congressman Paul Cook, member of the Armed Services Committee and Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces

Jennifer Morrow, Congressman Nunes’s Office Manager

John Sobel, Congressman Paul Cook’s Chief of Staff